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LITIGATING MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET 
CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS FOR SMALL 
BUSINESSES: HAVE THE COURTS GIVEN THE FDA 
TOO MUCH DEFERENCE? THE CASE FOR TAKING 
THE FOCUS OFF OF EFFICACY 
Stephanie P. Fekete+ 
The manufacturing of innovative medical devices is important for the 
continued success and growth of the health care system and is a contributing 
factor to the growth of the U.S. economy.  In 2007, the total market value of the 
medical device industry was $98 billion,1 and the market is estimated to 
experience an annual growth rate of over six percent through 2017.2  The U.S. 
Small Business Administration’s size standards classify a medical device 
manufacturer as a small business if it employs five hundred people or fewer.3  
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, only two percent of medical 
technology firms have more than five hundred employees, which strongly 
                     
 + J.D. and Certificate in Law and Public Policy Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of 
America, Columbus School of Law; B.B.A., 2013, University of Portland.  The author would like 
to thank her parents, Steve and Gigi Fekete, for their continuous love and support throughout her 
legal education.  The author would also like to thank Linwood Rayford of the U.S. Small Business 
Administration’s Office of Advocacy for his expert guidance and feedback during the writing of 
this Comment.  Finally, the author would like to thank the Catholic University Law Review staff 
members and editors for their hard work during the editing of this Comment. 
 1. U.S. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICES INDUSTRY ASSESSMENT 2 (2010), 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/Medical%20Device%20Industry%20Assessment%20FINAL%2
0II%203-24-10.pdf. 
 2. See David J. Dykeman et al., Medical Devices in the Digital Age, in HEALTH CARE IT: 
THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 
83, 85 (Arthur Peabody, Jr., ed., 2013) (stating that “industry analysts estimate that medical device 
industry revenues will grow by 6.6 percent annually through 2017”). 
 3. See generally U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS 
MATCHED TO NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM CODES 1–20 (2014), 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf.  For example, the following 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Codes have a size standard of 500 
employees: 325413 (In-Vitro Diagnostic Substance Manufacturing), id. at 10; 334510 
(Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus Manufacturing), id. at 16; 339112 (Surgical and 
Medical Instrument Manufacturing), id. at 19; 334517 (Irradiation Apparatus Manufacturing), id. 
at 16; 339113 (Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing), id. at 19; 339114 (Dental 
Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing), id., 339115 (Ophthalmic Goods Manufacturing),  id. 
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suggests that the medical device industry is almost exclusively comprised of 
small businesses.4 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the medical device 
industry and employs a rigorous approval process to determine when products 
may enter the market.5  The process typically requires manufacturers to undergo 
either a 510(k) approval—an approval that a medical device is “substantially 
equivalent” to a device already on the market6—or a premarket approval 
(PMA)—an application subject to scientific review.7  When making premarket 
determinations, the FDA requires that all medical devices meet standards for 
both safety and efficacy in the treatment of medical conditions for which the 
device is intended.8 
While the FDA’s goal is to authorize the sale of innovative medical devices 
that are safe for patient use,9 device manufacturers argue that the process to 
obtain FDA approval is unnecessarily expensive and burdensome.10  Device 
manufacturers assert that the approval process has systemic problems, including 
a lack of transparency, frequent turnover in FDA staff, and a strong insistence 
by the agency that manufacturers provide large amounts of data for each product 
submitted for approval.11 
                     
 4. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SECTION 1128 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
SAFETY AND INNOVATION ACT (FDASIA): SMALL BUSINESS REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeti
cActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDASIA/UCM360058.pdf.  Approximately 
90% of all medical device manufacturers in the United States have fewer than 100 employees, and 
80% of manufacturers have less than $30 million in sales.  CARL T. DEMARCO, MEDICAL DEVICE 
DESIGN AND REGULATION 6 (2011). 
 5. See Richard A. Merrill, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: The Architecture 
of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1996) (“It is, therefore, 
virtually impossible to market a new medical product without the FDA’s review and 
concurrence.”). 
 6. See 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medical 
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ (last 
updated Jan. 26, 2016). 
 7. See Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmission
s/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2014). 
 8. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(a)–(b) (2016). 
 9. DEMARCO, supra note 4, at 10 (“In addition to fostering medical device innovation, one 
of FDA’s missions is to get safe and effective devices to market expeditiously while ensuring that 
the devices on the market remain safe and effective.”). 
 10. See Bonnie Scott, Oversight Overhaul: Eliminating the Premarket Review of Medical 
Devices and Implementing a Provider-Centered Postmarket Surveillance Strategy, 66 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 377, 384 (2011).  See also Merrill, supra note 5, at 1753–54. 
 11. See JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 
INNOVATION: A SURVEY OF OVER 200 MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 6–7 (2010), 
http://advamed.org/res.download/30 (noting that FDA regulatory processes compared unfavorably 
to those of the EU among respondents in a survey of over 200 medical technology companies).  See 
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Such problems result in lengthy device approval procedures, which forces 
manufacturers to absorb significant product development costs and delays 
patients’ access to state-of-the-art medical technology.12  A 2010 survey 
indicated that “the average total cost . . . to bring a 510(k) product from concept 
to clearance was approximately $31 million, with $24 million spent on FDA 
dependent and/or related activities.”13  For PMA products, the average total cost 
was $94 million dollars, with $75 million dollars attributed to FDA-related 
activities.14  In a struggling economy, potential investors may be reluctant to 
invest in a manufacturer that does not have a reasonably prompt timetable for 
releasing new products.15 
As a result of the FDA’s establishment of high premarket review standards to 
prevent unsafe devices from entering the market,16 several manufacturers have 
focused on international opportunities that allow them to place their devices into 
the market faster and at lower cost, while still maintaining safety as a priority.17  
The medical device industry is experiencing a trend of manufacturers 
introducing their products in Europe before entering the U.S. market.18  The U.S. 
Congress took heed of this trend and passed legislation intended to prevent 
device manufacturers from exporting medical device innovation, manufacturing, 
and revenue abroad while still protecting the American public’s safety.19  The 
FDA has acknowledged that it needs to proactively seek ways to reduce the 
lengthy medical device approval process while maintaining a stringent standard 
of patient safety.20  The FDA commenced a comprehensive review of its 
                     
also Scott, supra note 10, at 384–87 (discussing the burdens of medical device manufacturers 
during the FDA premarket review process). 
 12. Scott, supra note 10, at 384–85. 
 13. MAKOWER ET AL., supra note 11, at 28. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Scott, supra note 10, at 390 (emphasizing that “[b]ecause of the risks involved in 
developing innovative products, [medical device] companies often have difficulty securing funding 
from ‘regular capital markets’” and “[p]otential investors are hesitant to back new device 
companies with unproven track records”). 
 16. Id. at 391 (acknowledging the FDA’s reasonable success at securing the safety and 
effectiveness of medical devices). 
 17. See id. at 390–91. 
 18. Id. at 378 (noting that medical device approval in Europe usually takes less time and costs 
less than in the United States).  See also John Chai, Premarket Review of Medical Devices in the 
United States, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 293, 303 (2000) (noting that “[m]ost companies had to relocate 
their resources and change their marketing strategy in order to survive” and that “[u]p to 43 percent 
of the companies had increased their manufacturing in Europe due to the concern that their products 
would not receive FDA approval for export”). 
 19. See infra Section I.A. 
 20. Jeffrey Shuren, Report: CDRH on Track to Improve Device Submission Review Process, 
FDA VOICE (June 11, 2014), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/06/report-cdrh-on-
track-to-improve-device-submission-review-process/. 
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regulations and procedures in 2014, and the medical device industry is anxiously 
waiting to see how the FDA will improve the approval process.21 
This Comment reviews how a medical device approval system, designed with 
good intentions to both promote medical innovation and protect patient safety, 
became so unwieldy.  To begin, this Comment discusses the statutory history 
behind FDA premarket review authority arising under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act (FDCA), the FDCA’s progeny, and the FDA’s development of 
regulations designed to ensure that devices are deemed safe through product 
safety and efficacy determinations.  In examining FDA regulations, this 
Comment reviews pertinent court decisions regarding device manufacturers’ 
challenges of FDA approval determinations based on safety and efficacy 
standards.  This Comment then addresses how premarket regulations have 
impacted small businesses and outlines approaches the FDA could adopt to 
ameliorate systemic problems in the current approval process.  Finally, this 
Comment argues that FDA premarket regulations should focus on product safety 
and shift product efficacy into the postmarket surveillance regulatory system, 
which could remove significant hurdles that slow the device approval process 
without compromising patient safety. 
I.  THE LEGAL HISTORY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
A.  Historical Overview of the FDA’s Authority to Regulate and Approve 
Medical Devices 
Congress has acknowledged the importance of the medical device industry to 
the U.S. economy and, as a result, it continues to legislate ways to improve the 
FDA’s premarket review process while simultaneously protecting the public 
from harmful devices.22  The FDA has authority to regulate medical devices that 
companies wish to place into the stream of commerce under the FDCA,23 which 
was amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to provide for 
medical device regulations.24  The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 created 
                     
 21. Id. 
 22. See generally, 21 U.S.C §§ 301–399f (2012); Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2012)); 
Safe Medical Device Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990) (codified in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C. (2012)); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2012)); Medical 
Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, § 101, 116 Stat. 1588, 1589 
(2002) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379(i) (2012)).  See also infra text accompanying 
endnotes 23–34. 
 23. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 301–399f (2012).  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C 
§ 360f(a) (describing the authority of the FDA to ban dangerous medical devices). 
 24. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2012)).  Before 1976, the FDA had very limited 
control over regulating medical devices.  Scott, supra note 10, at 380.  The Medical Device 
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an FDA classification system25 to categorize the wide range of medical devices 
invented by the industry based on each device’s level of risk.26 
As the FDA promulgated medical device premarket regulations following the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, concerns arose regarding unsafe medical 
devices entering the market.27  In response to these concerns, Congress passed 
the Safe Medical Device Act of 1990,28 which granted the FDA additional 
authority to promulgate safety and effectiveness requirements.29  One of the 
most notable changes affected the meaning of “substantial equivalence.”30  The 
substantial equivalence standard now requires manufacturers to show that a 
proposed device has the same intended use and technological characteristics as 
a device already in the market.31 
In an effort to ensure that the FDA could more effectively regulate medical 
devices and strike a proper balance between patient safety and device 
                     
Amendments of 1976 granted the FDA the authority to regulate medical devices and expanded the 
FDA’s regulatory framework with the classification system.  Id. 
 25. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 26. § 513(a)(1), 90 Stat. at 540–42.  See also Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Substantial Equivalence 
Premarket Review: the Right Approach for Most Medical Devices, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 367 
(2014) (stating that “the congressional vision was to provide FDA with ample authority to conduct 
risk-based regulation of devices from cradle to grave”).  Regarding safety and effectiveness, risk is 
not determined solely based on the patients: 
The safety and effectiveness of a device are to be determined – (A) with respect to the 
persons for whose use the device is represented or intended, (B) with respect to the 
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling of the device, 
and (C) weighing any probable benefit to health from the use of the device against any 
probable risk of injury or illness from such use. 
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 27. See Ralph F. Hall & Michelle Mercer, Rethinking Lohr: Does “SE” Mean Safe and 
Effective, Substantially Equivalent, or Both?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 737, 745–47 (2012) 
(discussing the development of medical device regulation following the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976).  See also Shapiro, supra note 26, at 367 (discussing the initial problems 
with the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, including issues with review times and performance 
standards). 
 28. Safe Medical Device Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990) (codified 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 29. See Hall & Mercer, supra note 27, at 747–48.  Hall and Mercer state: 
The first major post-1976 reformation of the FDCA was the Safe Medical Device Act of 
1990 (SMDA), which was adopted in response to concerns that devices were not being 
adequately regulated and in response to a number of mishaps in the medical device realm.  
The SMDA substantially expanded FDA authority over medical device regulation and 
increased burdens on manufacturers of medical devices. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 30. § 12, 104 Stat. at 4523–24. 
 31. Id.  See Hall & Mercer, supra note 27, at 748.  See also Shapiro, supra note 26, at 369 
(outlining the significance of the SMDA for substantial equivalence). 
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availability, Congress passed the FDA Modernization Act in 1997.32  The Act 
made changes to medical device premarket regulations.  One of the major 
changes introduced the concept of “good guidance practices,” which attempts to 
clarify the FDA’s interpretation of regulations.33  Subsequently, Congress 
enacted the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act in 2002, which 
attempts to provide the FDA with resources to help medical device 
manufacturers bring their devices into the market more expeditiously, subject to 
safety and effectiveness requirements.34 
B.  The Premarket Review Process and an Examination of the FDA’s 
Standards of Review for Medical Device Approval 
1.  Overview of the FDA Premarket Review Process 
The medical device classification system consists of three categories: Class I, 
Class II, and Class III.35  Unless exempted, devices in all three classes are subject 
to general controls.36  Controls are standards used “to provide reasonable 
assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.”37 
Class I devices are considered low risk devices, such as elastic bandages and 
tongue depressors, and are subject to general controls.38  General controls, which 
                     
 32. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 
Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2012)).  See THOMAS J. 
DUESTERBERG ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM, REGULATION, AND INNOVATION IN THE MEDICAL 
DEVICE INDUSTRY 83 (1994) (acknowledging that “it is not surprising that it has been difficult to 
balance the competing demands of safety and availability of high quality care within the regulatory 
apparatus”). 
 33. § 405, 111 Stat. at 2369. 
 34. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, § 101, 
116 Stat. 1588, 1589 (2002) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379(i) (2012)).  See Hall & Mercer, 
supra note 27, at 751. 
 35. Medical Device Classification Procedures, 21 C.F.R. § 860.1 (2016). 
 36. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2012) (describing the requirements for general controls). 
 37. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii).  See also Michael E. Wiklund, Is Your Human Factors Program 
Ready for FDA Scrutiny?, in DESIGNING USABILITY INTO MEDICAL PRODUCTS 21, 25–26 
(Michael E. Wiklund & Stephen B. Wilcox, eds., 2005) (explaining the premarket review process 
and the types of concerns that FDA reviewers may have when reviewing a medical device for 
premarket clearance). 
 38. FDA Device Guidance: Medical Device Accessories: Defining Accessories and 
Classification Pathway for New Accessory Types, POL’Y & MED. (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.policymed.com/2015/01/fda-device-guidance-medical-device-accessories-defining-
accessories-and-classification-pathway-for-n.html.  A device can still be classified as Class I even 
in instances where safety and efficacy cannot be reasonably determined: 
A device is in class I if (i) general controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance 
of the safety and effectiveness of the device, or (ii) there is insufficient information from 
which to determine that general controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance 
of the safety and effectiveness of the device or to establish special controls to provide 
such assurance, but the device is not life-supporting or life-sustaining or for a use which 
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all medical devices are subject to under the FDCA, include adulterated39 and 
misbranded device prevention,40 registration of producers of devices,41 banned 
devices,42 notifications and other remedies,43 records and reports on devices,44 
and general provisions respecting control of devices intended for human use.45 
Class II devices are considered moderate risk devices, such as pregnancy test 
kits and powered wheelchairs.46  These devices are subject to special controls 
when general controls are not enough “to provide reasonable assurance of [the 
device’s] safety and effectiveness.”47  Special controls include “performance 
standards, postmarket surveillance, patient registries, . . . guidelines, . . . 
recommendations, and other appropriate actions that the [FDA] deems 
necessary.”48  In most instances, Class II devices obtain FDA clearance to enter 
the market through the 510(k) premarket submission process.49  The 510(k) 
submission, also referred to as a Premarket Notification (PMN), requires the 
applicant to submit clinical trial data and accompanying certifications.50  
Following a 510(k) submission, the FDA then has ninety days to make a 
determination.51  A Class II device can be exempted, and thus reclassified as a 
Class I device, if the FDA determines that a report “is not necessary to assure 
the safety and effectiveness of the device”; the determination is then published 
in the Federal Register.52 
Class III devices are considered high-risk devices, such as pacemakers and 
breast implants, and are subject to general controls as well as premarket 
approval.53  Out of the three classifications of devices, a PMA submission 
requires the device manufacturer to provide the FDA with the most substantial 
                     
is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, and which does 
not present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury. 
21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1). 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2012). 
 40. Id. § 352. 
 41. Id. § 360. 
 42. Id. § 360f. 
 43. Id. § 360h. 
 44. Id. § 360i. 
 45. Id. § 360j. 
 46. Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucm142523.htm (last 
updated June 4, 2014). 
 47. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2016). 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
 49. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2). 
 50. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012). 
 51. Id. § 360(n)(1). 
 52. Id. § 360(m)(2). 
 53. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C); see also Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for 
Marketing, supra note 46. 
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amount of information, including underlying clinical studies and information as 
to the device’s efficacy and safety, which can take many years to complete.54  
Following a PMA submission, the FDA is given 180 days to approve or deny 
the submission.55 
Most medical devices begin in Class III by default.56  However, if the device 
was introduced into the marketplace before 1976 or is “substantially equivalent 
to another device” that was previously classified as a Class I or Class II device 
(commonly referred to as substantial equivalence), then the proposed new device 
does not begin in Class III.57  The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 created 
the substantial equivalence determination as a core component in the 510(k) 
premarket notification process.58  Additionally, 21 U.S.C. § 360c(e) allows the 
FDA to change a device’s classification and requires the FDA to publish a 
reclassification order in the Federal Register, conduct a device classification 
panel meeting, and consider public comments.59 
                     
 54. A PMA submission requires the following: (1) “full reports of all information . . . 
concerning investigations”; (2) “a full statement of the components, ingredients, and properties . . 
. of such device”; (3) “a full description of the methods used in . . . the manufacture, processing, . . 
. packing and installation of such device”; (4) “an identifying reference to any performance 
standard”; (5) “samples of such device”; (6) “specimens of the labeling proposed”; (7) “the 
certification required under [the Public Health Act]”; and (8) other relevant information that the 
FDA or panel may require.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A)–(H). 
 55. Id. § 360e(d)(1)(A).  The FDA may only deny the submission if there is: (1) “a lack of 
showing of reasonable assurance” in the safety or effectiveness of the device; (2) the 
“manufactur[ing], processing, packing, or installation” methods do not conform to the appropriate 
requirements; (3) there is “false or misleading” labeling; or (4) the device does not conform to the 
required standards.  Id. § 360e(d)(2)(A)–(E). 
 56. Id. § 360c(f)(1) (“Any device intended for human use which was not introduced or 
delivered for introduction into interstate commerce for commercial distribution before May 28, 
1976, is classified in class III . . . .”). 
 57. Id. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 58. Id. § 360c(f) (describing the 510(k) premarket notification process and the substantial 
equivalence determination). 
 59. Id. § 360c(e)(1)(A)(i).  The provision states: 
Based on new information respecting a device, the Secretary may, upon [his own] 
initiative . . . or upon petition of an interested person, change the classification of such 
device, and revoke, on account of the change in classification, any regulation or 
requirement in effect . . . with respect to such device, by administrative order published 
in the Federal Register following publication of a proposed reclassification order in the 
Federal Register, a meeting of a device classification panel . . . and consideration of 
comments to a public docket . . . . 
Id. 
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2. A Comparison of the FDA and the European Union’s Safety and 
Performance Requirements for Medical Devices: “Clinically Significant 
Results” Versus Manufacturer’s Intent 
The FDA issued regulations designed to implement Congress’s legislative 
initiatives, which require the FDA to use safety and effectiveness as the 
standards for approving medical devices.60  Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations outlines factors that the FDA considers when making safety and 
efficacy determinations.61  For safety, the FDA uses a balancing test to weigh 
benefits against risks: 
There is reasonable assurance that a device is safe when it can be 
determined, based upon valid scientific evidence, that the probable 
benefits to health from use of the device for its intended uses and 
conditions of use, when accompanied by adequate directions and 
warnings against unsafe use, outweigh any probable risks. The valid 
scientific evidence used to determine the safety of a device shall 
adequately demonstrate the absence of unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury associated with the use of the device for its intended uses and 
conditions of use.62 
For efficacy, the FDA focuses on results rather than conducting a balancing test: 
There is reasonable assurance that a device is effective when it can be 
determined, based upon valid scientific evidence, that in a significant 
portion of the target population, the use of the device for its intended 
uses and conditions of use, when accompanied by adequate directions 
                     
 60. See generally, 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2016). 
 61. When classifying Class II and Class III devices, the FDA considers the following factors 
when determining safety and effectiveness: 
(1) The persons for whose use the device is represented or intended; (2) the conditions 
of use for the device, including conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested 
in the labeling or advertising of the device, and other intended conditions of use; (3) the 
probable benefit to health from the use of the device weighed against any probable injury 
or illness from such use; and (4) the reliability of the device. 
Id. § 860.7(b). 
 62. Id. § 860.7(d)(1).  See also Classification Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 32,988, 32,991 (July 
28, 1978) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 20 & 860).  In response to comments requesting a definition 
that is more objective and specific regarding “reasonable assurance of device safety” the FDA 
stated that 
[t]he wording of the proposed section closely follows the wording of section 513 of the 
act.  The legislative history . . . explains that determination of device safety involves 
balancing the probable benefits of a device against its probable risks. Consequently, 
proof of device safety is intended to establish that the risks are not unreasonably 
disproportionate to the benefits.  The proposed section merely expands this concept, 
emphasizing that only valid scientific evidence may be used to establish device safety. 
Id. 
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for use and warnings against unsafe use, will provide clinically 
significant results.63 
The European Union (EU) has a classification system for premarket 
regulations based on risk, not unlike the United States.64  However, where the 
FDA evaluates safety and effectiveness, the EU evaluates medical devices based 
on a standard of safety and performance.65  For safety, the EU employs a 
balancing test similar to the one used by the FDA: 
The devices must be designed and manufactured in such a way that, 
when used under the conditions and for the purposes intended, they 
will not compromise, directly or indirectly, the clinical condition or 
the safety of the patients, the safety or health of users or, where 
applicable, other persons, or the safety of property. Any risks which 
may be associated with their use must be acceptable when weighed 
against the benefits to the patient and be compatible with a high level 
of protection of health and safety.66 
The EU also conducts an assessment which, like the FDA’s assessment, 
focuses on results, but instead uses a device’s performance relative to the 
manufacturer’s intent rather than effectiveness as the standard: “[The device] 
must achieve the performances, in particular, where appropriate, in terms of 
analytical sensitivity, diagnostic sensitivity, analytical specificity, diagnostic 
specificity, accuracy, repeatability, reproducibility, including control of known 
relevant interference, and limits of detection, stated by the manufacturer.”67 
Based on standards for safety and performance, the EU strongly emphasizes 
safety and health when evaluating medical devices.68  Unlike the United States, 
where the goal is for the manufacturer to “provide clinically significant 
                     
 63. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(e)(1).  See also Classification Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. at 32,990 
(responding to comments regarding using scientific evidence for safety and efficacy).  The 
Classification Procedures state: 
The purpose of the act is to assure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices 
intended for human use.  Because such assurance necessarily demands a high standard 
of proof, section 513(a)(3) of the act requires that device effectiveness be established 
only by valid scientific evidence.  The Commissioner has extended this requirement to 
the establishment of device safety as well.  The requirement that only valid scientific 
evidence be used to establish device safety and effectiveness, however, does not preclude 
consideration of other forms of evidence when determining whether a device is safe or 
effective. 
Id. 
 64. See Christa Altenstetter, US Perspectives on the EU Medical Devices Approval System, 
and Lessons Learned from the United States, 4 EUR. J. OF RISK REG. 443, 447 (2013). 
 65. See id. at 455–56. 
 66. Council Directive, 98/79, 1998 O.J. (L 331) 16 (EC). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
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results,”69 the EU’s performance standard stresses the device’s ability to perform 
in the way that the manufacturer intended.70 
3.  The Contact Lens Decision and the Beginning of Deference to the FDA 
for Medical Device Classifications 
One of the earliest legal challenges to the FDA’s safety and efficacy 
requirements occurred in 1985 when the Contact Lens Manufacturers 
Association (CLMA) challenged the FDA’s classification of rigid gas permeable 
contact lenses as a Class III device.71  During the premarket process, the FDA 
originally proposed to reclassify the contact lenses from Class III to Class I, even 
though CLMA requested that the contact lens be reclassified as a Class II 
device.72  The FDA asserted that there was sufficient information to establish a 
performance standard as a Class II device and that safety and efficacy could be 
established without the Class II performance standard, which is why the FDA 
proposed Class I for the contact lenses.73  However, after receiving public 
comment on the proposed reclassification, the FDA withdrew the proposal and 
stated that the device should be classified as a Class III device because neither 
the Class I nor Class II designations could provide reasonable assurances of 
safety and effectiveness for the contact lenses.74 
CLMA argued that by withdrawing the reclassification proposal, the FDA 
disregarded the overall consensus in the medical industry that favored the 
reclassification and belittled the “valid scientific evidence” requirement for 
safety and effectiveness.75  The court agreed that perhaps the lenses should not 
be subject to such strict regulatory requirements, but determined that it would 
not change the FDA’s decision because the FDA “acted within an area of its 
expertise, it ruled in a manner at least arguably consistent with the statutory 
                     
 69. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(e)(1) (2016). 
 70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 71. Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food & Drug Admin., 766 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(deciding the first case where a device was considered for reclassification under the “transitional 
provisions” of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976). 
 72. Id. at 596. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 596–97.  The FDA reasoned that the lenses should not be Class I devices because it 
“could not determine whether a new lens was ‘substantially equivalent’ to an already-marketed lens 
without securing a wealth of detailed information about both lenses’ composition and 
manufacture.”  Id. at 597.  The FDA then reasoned that the lenses could not be Class II devices 
because “even if such information could be gathered for the purpose of establishing a ‘performance 
standard’ and measuring new lenses against it, conformity with the standard would not guarantee 
that a lens would function safely and effectively in the human eye.”  Id. at 597 (citing 
Reclassification of Daily Wear Spherical Contact Lenses Consisting of Rigid Gas Permeable Plastic 
Materials; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,778, 56,780–81 (Dec. 23, 1983)). 
 75. Contact Lens, 766 F.2d at 597. 
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scheme, and it considered the matter in a detailed, adequately reasoned 
fashion.”76 
4. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review and the Chevron 
Doctrine Under the Administrative Procedure Act 
When a device manufacturer disagrees with an FDA decision regarding 
premarket classification or approval, the manufacturer may seek redress through 
the courts.  Because the FDA is a federal government agency, the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) governs FDA decisions regarding premarket review for 
medical devices, including safety and effectiveness determinations.77  In 
particular, section 706 of the APA provides that any reviewing court must use 
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, which provides that “[t]o the 
extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall . . . 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be 
. . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”78 
Courts must presume that an agency’s action is valid under this standard.79  
This is a demanding threshold for any medical device manufacturer to overcome, 
and the validity presumption is difficult to overturn because it only requires that 
the FDA have a rational basis for its decision.80  Indeed, courts have 
acknowledged the FDA’s considerable discretion when making decisions 
relating to safety and effectiveness of medical devices.81 
                     
 76. Id. 
 77. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no 
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.  A preliminary, 
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to 
review on the review of the final agency action. 
Id.  See also DEMARCO, supra note 4, at 24–25 (explaining how a regulated entity may seek judicial 
review in the courts). 
 78. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 79. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 762 F. Supp. 382, 386 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(explaining that “[u]nder this standard, there is a presumption in favor of the validity of 
administrative action.  A court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”). 
 80. See United States v. Snoring Relief Labs, Inc., 210 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000).  The 
Ninth Circuit defined the arbitrary and capricious standard as being met when: 
[T]he agency “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for 
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that 
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or product of agency expertise.” 
Id. (quoting O’Keeffe’s, Inc. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 92 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 
1996))). 
 81. See Ethicon, 762 F. Supp. at 386 (examining congressional intent regarding safety and 
effectiveness decisions and stating that “Congress gave FDA sweeping discretion in determining 
the classification of devices and therefore in judging the safety and effectiveness of medical 
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Additionally, when a court reviews agency actions that interpret statutes, the 
Chevron doctrine applies, requiring courts to employ a two-step analysis.82  The 
first step requires the court to ask whether Congress expressly addressed the 
matter at issue.83  If it has, then the inquiry ends there, and the agency must 
follow the express intent of Congress.84  If Congress did not expressly address 
the matter at issue, then the second step requires the court to determine whether 
the agency adopted “a permissible construction of the statute.”85  Under the 
Chevron doctrine, the court does not substitute its judgment for the agency’s 
action, even in cases where congressional intent may be implicit.86  The second 
step is commonly viewed as a reasonableness inquiry,87 which many scholars 
believe is similar to the arbitrariness inquiry under the APA.88 
C.  A Chronology of Pertinent Court Holdings Regarding Safety and 
Effectiveness Determinations by the FDA Under the APA 
While premarket medical device decisions regarding safety and efficacy do 
not typically occur in the courts outside of preemption determinations,89 the 
                     
devices”).  See also SHARON FRANK, A NEW MODEL FOR EUROPEAN MEDICAL DEVICE 
REGULATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE EU AND THE USA 168 (2003) 
(acknowledging that “Congress did not find itself in the position to determine the appropriate 
classification of every medical device in existence or yet to be invented”). 
 82. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 83. Id. at 842. 
 84. Id. at 842–43. 
 85. Id. at 843. 
 86. Id. at 844 (explaining that “[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit.  In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of 
an agency.”). 
 87. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1734 (2011); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two 
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1260 (1997); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian 
Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009). 
 88. Levin, supra note 87, at 1285 (arguing that “step two [of the Chevron doctrine] should be 
regarded as equivalent to arbitrariness review, because that mode of review, taken together with 
Chevron step one, can accommodate all the lines of analysis that courts have been pursuing under 
Chevron step two”). 
 89. While preemption is not the focus of this Comment, it is an important component of safety 
and efficacy determinations from a product liability perspective in a tort claim.  Two Supreme 
Court cases provide the framework for preemption in product liability claims against medical 
devices.  See DEMARCO, supra note 4, at 25–26 (explaining preemption of state laws and 
regulations for medical devices); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–28 (2008) (deciding 
that 21 U.S.C. § 360k preempted state law product liability claims against PMA devices); 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500–08 (1996) (deciding that under certain circumstances 
21 U.S.C. § 360k preempted state law product liability claims against 510(k) devices).  See also 
Hall & Mercer, supra note 27, at 771–72 (analyzing medical device regulation and product liability 
preemption following the Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) 
from the perspective of the 510(k) system). 
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courts have articulated important factors in making safety and efficacy 
determinations and applying the arbitrary and capricious standard from the APA. 
1.  Bowen: Placing Products in Class III By Operation of Law 
In United States v. Bowen,90 Sterilization Systems, a dental handpiece 
sterilizer manufacturer, sought exemption from FDA premarket requirements 
because its device was “the substantial equivalent of a preexisting, legally 
marketed device” and was therefore subject to a 510(k) submission.91  The FDA 
denied the exemption, but Sterilization Systems continued to sell the product.92  
Sterilization Systems argued that the FDA had “acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously” when it classified the product as a Class III device, making it 
subject to premarket approval.93 
The court noted that “the only question under the [FDCA] is whether the 
intended use of the product is to prevent disease, not whether the product 
actually prevents disease.”94  Regarding Sterilization Systems’s argument that 
the FDA improperly classified the product as Class III, the court held that the 
classification was not arbitrary or capricious because the product was in Class 
III “by operation of law.”95  Because all devices begin in Class III and the 
manufacturer “did not request reclassification before he introduced [the device] 
into interstate commerce,” the classification was not arbitrary or capricious, 
regardless of whether the FDA “had sufficient knowledge of [the product] to 
determine if it was ‘safe.’”96 
2.  Ethicon, Inc.: Applying Contact Lens and Interpreting Performance 
Standards 
In Ethicon, Inc. v. Food & Drug Administration,97 Ethicon, a manufacturer of 
poly absorbable surgical sutures, brought suit against the FDA, alleging that the 
FDA improperly reclassified a class of surgical sutures from Class III to Class 
II.98  Ethicon argued that the FDA reclassification decision was arbitrary and 
capricious, and therefore in violation of the APA, because the decision did not 
satisfy “both the substantive and procedural statutory requirements for 
reclassification.”99  The court determined that the Contact Lens decision did not 
apply because the device at issue in Ethicon was similar to a device already on 
                     
 90. 172 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 91. Id. at 684. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 686. 
 95. Id. at 688. 
 96. Id. at 687–88. 
 97. 762 F. Supp. 382 (D.D.C. 1991). 
 98. Id. at 383–84. 
 99. Id. at 385–86. 
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the market, whereas Contact Lens involved a different device altogether.100  The 
court then turned to the parties’ differing interpretations of “what constitutes 
‘sufficient information to establish a performance standard’ that will ‘provide 
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.’”101  
According to the FDA, sufficient information means that “valid scientific 
evidence” supports the performance standards for safety and effectiveness.102  
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court upheld the FDA’s 
determination because the safety and effectiveness requirement was satisfied.103 
Ethicon also questioned whether the FDA properly established a performance 
standard during Ethicon’s premarket review process.104  Ethicon argued that in 
order to establish a performance standard, the FDA must “determine what tests 
must be performed, and explain how the values obtained on those tests would 
assure the safety and effectiveness of the new device.”105  The court looked to 
congressional intent and explained that 
Congress knew that FDA could not establish performance standards 
for the universe of Class II devices, and encouraged FDA to use its 
discretion to pursue such standards in order of priority. . . [T]he 
evidence showed that a performance standard was not immediately 
necessary to protect the public health.106 
The FDA is only responsible for determining “whether the generic class is 
sufficiently identified to permit comparisons of the safety and effectiveness of a 
newer device within that generic class” which, according to the court, the FDA 
accomplished.107 
                     
 100. Id. at 387–88 (distinguishing the Contact Lens holding from a poly suture with similar 
devices in interstate commerce). 
 101. Id. at 388 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2012)) (discussing the correct 
interpretation of the statutory definition for Class II devices). 
 102. Id. (noting that the issue was “whether the administrative record contains sufficient 
information for the agency to understand the device and sufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
factors determining the device’s safety and effectiveness are controllable”). 
 103. Id. at 388–89. 
 104. Id. at 389–91 (discussing the performance standard as required under 21 U.S.C. § 
360c(a)(1)(B)). 
 105. Id. at 389.  Ethicon argued that “publicly available scientific literature” is not enough to 
constitute a sufficient performance standard and should instead be used as a benchmark for end-
product testing, which would then be used to develop the performance standard.  Id. at 389–90.  
The FDA, however, argued that “it had a rational basis” for establishing a performance standard, 
with which the court agreed.  Id. at 390. 
 106. Id. at 390. 
 107. Id. at 391.  The court did note, however, that “[i]n a perfect world, performance standards 
would be set for each and all medical devices prior to their exposure to the public,” and that “[i]n 
the imperfect, but not defective, world of medical device regulation created by Congress, 
performance standards are but a desired goal not required to be promptly reached.”  Id. 
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3.  Cytori Therapeutics, Inc.: Applying a Rational Basis Standard of Review 
As in Ethicon, courts have generally upheld FDA classification 
determinations.  In Cytori Therapeutics, Inc. v. Food & Drug Administration,108 
a case from 2013, the court determined that an FDA decision to classify a device 
that harvested and concentrated stem and regenerative cells from fat as a Class 
III device was “reasonable and reasonably explained for purposes of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.”109 
The manufacturer, Cytori Therapeutics, Inc., claimed in its premarket 
notification that its device was “substantially equivalent” to other devices on the 
market that “harvest cells from blood and bone marrow.”110  The FDA, however, 
rejected Cytori’s claim both because “[f]at is not blood” and “the devices had 
different technological characteristics or posed different safety concerns.”111  
The court held that the FDA “reasonably determined – and reasonably explained 
its determination – that the [device] met neither the ‘intended use’ criterion nor 
the ‘technological characteristics’ criterion” that the FDA considers when 
classifying a device as a Class II device.112 
4.  Ivy Sports Med, LLC.: Reclassification and Reasonable Time for FDA 
Reclassification Decisions 
Despite congressional enactments to improve the premarket process for 
medical devices, manufacturers argue that they still experience difficulties.113  
For example, Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Sebelius114 involved a medical device 
company, ReGen Biologics (ReGen), which had been undergoing the premarket 
review process in connection with one of its devices for over sixteen years.115  
The FDA rejected multiple applications before initially approving the device in 
2008.116  In 2011, however, the FDA reclassified the device at issue from Class 
II to Class III because “the differences between the technological 
characteristics” of the device and the devices on the market with which ReGen 
claimed substantial equivalency “raise different questions of safety and 
                     
 108. 715 F.3d 922 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 109. Id. at 924. 
 110. Id. at 925. 
 111. Id. (discussing the FDA’s distinction between devices that harvest cells from blood and 
bone marrow from Cytori’s device that harvests cells from fat). 
 112. Id. at 927. 
 113. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 1753–54. 
 114. 938 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 
F.3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 115. Id. at 48. 
 116. The Class II classification came after the FDA consulted with an expert advisory panel, 
which concluded that the device was as safe and effective as devices already on the market.  See 
id. at 52. 
2016] Litigating Premarket Classification Decisions 621 
effectiveness.”117  A few months after the FDA reclassified the device, ReGen 
Biologics went bankrupt, and Ivy Sports Medicine, LLC (Ivy) became the 
successor in interest.118 
Ivy sued, claiming that the FDA violated the APA because the FDA failed to 
follow correct reclassification procedures.119  The court acknowledged that “the 
Administrative Record contain[ed] several examples of misconduct affecting the 
integrity of the . . . device’s 2008 substantial equivalence determination.”120  
Even though the FDA departed from normal agency practices, the court ruled 
that the FDA could still exercise its inherent authority to reevaluate the 
premarket decision.121  When evaluating the standard for a reasonable amount 
of time, the court considered eight factors122 and ruled that those factors tended 
to favor the FDA, despite the fact that “Ivy invested time and money in reliance 
upon the FDA’s substantial equivalence determination.”123 
On appeal, Ivy argued that the FDA did not have inherent authority to 
reclassify the device and was required to exercise its statutory authority to 
reclassify the device under 21 U.S.C. § 360c(e).124  In particular, Ivy argued that 
inherent authority does not apply in instances where Congress has spoken on the 
matter.125  Because Congress devised a specific statutory scheme that governs 
how the FDA makes reclassification decisions, the FDA must follow the proper 
administrative procedures, including notice and comment.126 
                     
 117. Id. at 54.  There was also evidence of political pressure from members of Congress and 
social pressure from an article published by the Wall Street Journal, which questioned the integrity 
of the review process.  See id. at 52–53.; see also Alicia Mundy, Political Lobbying Drove FDA 
Process, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2009), at A1, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1236299547839 
46701. 
 118. Ivy Sports Med., Inc., 938 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
 119. Id. at 55. 
 120. Id. at 57. 
 121. Id. at 59. 
 122. The eight factors included the following: 
the complexity of the decision; whether the decision was based on fact or law; whether 
the agency acted according to its general procedures for review; the express time limit 
for appeals set forth in agency regulations; whether legally cognizable property interests 
had arisen through the initial decision; whether parties had relied upon the initial 
decision; whether the agency acted in bad faith by advancing a pretextual explanation to 
justify reconsideration; whether the agency provided notice of its intent to reconsider the 
initial decision; and the probable impact of an erroneous agency decision absent 
reconsideration. 
Id. at 62. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86–87 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 125. Id. (citing Am. Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 126. Id.  Ivy argued that “Congress precluded FDA from exercising inherent authority to 
rescind substantial equivalence determinations by creating in 21 U.S.C. §360c(e) a specific 
statutory mechanism to correct alleged device classification errors.”  Id. 
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The appellate court agreed with Ivy and held that “because FDA concededly 
could have used Section 360c(e) to reclassify [the device] into Class III, it could 
not rely on a claimed inherent reconsideration authority to short-circuit that 
statutory process and revoke its prior substantial equivalence determination to 
achieve that same result.”127  The court noted: “[N]otice and comment helps to 
prevent mistakes, because agencies receive more input and information before 
they make a final decision.  [It] also helps ensure that regulated parties receive 
fair treatment. . . .  So notice and comment, while somewhat burdensome, serves 
important purposes both generally and in this statute.”128  The court did not 
specifically rule on whether the FDA properly reclassified the device on the 
merits, but noted that the FDA may have been correct in its decision to reclassify 
the device.129 
II.  BECAUSE LEGAL PRECEDENT IS UNLIKELY TO FOSTER IMPROVEMENTS IN 
THE FDA’S PREMARKET APPROVAL PROCESS, CONGRESS, THE FDA, AND 
MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS SHOULD CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE 
WAY TO IMPROVE THE APPROVAL PROCESS 
Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation 
Act (FDASIA) in 2012 to simplify the process of developing and reviewing 
medical devices while continuing to maintain a focus on patient safety.130  
Congress intended the Act to, among other things, expedite the overall medical 
device approval process.131  Following the FDASIA, the FDA issued a proposed 
rule in March 2014 to amend its regulations regarding classification and 
reclassification of medical devices to conform to the FDASIA.132  One of the 
                     
 127. Id. at 87.  The court also discussed how revoking a substantial equivalence decision acts 
as a de facto reclassification decision: 
It may well be correct, as FDA contends, that the statutory procedures [for determining 
substantial equivalence and for reclassification] are not mirror images of one another.  
But the fundamental question both provisions address – what is the appropriate 
classification of a new device? – is the same.  And as a practical matter, the decision to 
revoke a substantial equivalence determination in circumstances like those present here 
is a de facto reclassification of the device into Class III, at least absent other FDA action.  
If FDA finds that a device is no longer substantially equivalent to any existing Class I or 
Class II devices, that device is automatically reclassified as a Class III device.  In other 
words, to revoke a substantial equivalence determination is to “change the classification,” 
21 U.S.C. § 360c(e)(2), of that device. 
Id. 
 128. Id. at 87–88. 
 129. See id. at 87. 
 130. Food & Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 
993 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 131. Id. § 201(b), 126 Stat. at 1002. 
 132. Medical Device Classification Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 16,252, 16,253 (proposed Mar. 
25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 860).  The FDA extended the comment period to 
September 22, 2014, but no final rule has been issued as of the publication of this Comment.  See 
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proposed changes would establish five subcategories of devices for Class III 
devices “based on the risks, benefits, and available controls” for the devices.133 
As part of the FDASIA, Congress also adopted the Medical Device User Fee 
Amendments of 2012.134  In the same year, the FDA agreed to the medical device 
industry’s request to assess independently the medical device review process.135  
An independent assessment was undertaken to identify factors that were likely 
having a significant impact on overall premarket review times, and the FDA 
provided a set of priority recommendations addressing these factors.136  The final 
report, which included an extensive list of recommendations spanning multiple 
areas, was released on June 11, 2014.137  In response to the recommendations 
and criticisms, the FDA has developed plans to modernize the premarket review 
process, such as consulting with industry experts,138 developing a more 
expedited 510(k) approval process,139 and user fee programs.140  None of the 
new initiatives, however, address the safety and effectiveness standard. 
                     
Medical Device Classification Procedures; Extension of Comment Period, 79 Fed. Reg. 33,711, 
33,711 (proposed June 12, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 860). 
 133. Medical Device Classification Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. at 16,255.  The five categories 
include the following: (1) “devices that present known risks that cannot be controlled”; (2) “devices 
for which the risk-benefit profile is unknown or unfavorable”; (3) “devices for which a full review 
of manufacturing information is necessary”; (4) “devices for which premarket review of any change 
affecting safety or effectiveness is necessary”; and (5) “combination products.”  Id. at 16,255–56. 
 134. Food & Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act §§ 201–208, 126 Stat. at 1002–
08.  Congress intended for the amendments to ensure that fees were put toward “expediting the 
process for the review of device applications.” § 201(b), 126 Stat. at 1002. 
 135. See 21 U.S.C. § 379j-1 (2012). 
 136. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MDUFA II/III EVALUATION—PRIORITY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1–5 (2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Device 
RegulationandGDeviceR/Overview/MDUFAIII/UCM378202.pdf. 
 137. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, DELIVERABLE 10: FINAL REPORT ON FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1–4 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Device 
RegulationandGuidance/Overview/MDUFAIII/UCM400676.pdf.  See also Shuren, supra note 20.  
The author states: 
Initially, the contractor identified 31 unique issues related to the device submission 
review process.  They concluded that CDRH had taken steps to address 21 of those 31 
issues—either through the development and implementation of new MDUFA III 
provisions, updated systems, and/or processes for review staff—and that we had at least 
begun to address another nine of the issues. 
Id. 
 138. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPROVEMENTS IN DEVICE REVIEW: RESULTS OF CDRH’S 
PLAN OF ACTION FOR PREMARKET REVIEW OF DEVICES 11 (2012), http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM329702. 
 139. Id. at 5–7. 
 140. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SECTION 1128 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION SAFETY AND INNOVATION ACT (FDASIA): SMALL BUSINESS REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 4, at 5–7; Altenstetter, supra note 64, at 462–63.  See also Kurt H. Kruger 
& Max A. Kruger, The Medical Device Sector, in THE BUSINESS OF HEALTHCARE INNOVATION 
376, 445 (Lawton Robert Burns ed., 2d ed. 2012) (“The potential clarifications regarding the 510(k) 
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III.  THE IMPACT OF THE FDA SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS REGULATIONS ON 
SMALL BUSINESS MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS 
A.  The Problem with Premarket Safety and Efficacy Requirements Decisions 
Despite efforts by Congress and the FDA to make the premarket process faster 
and less burdensome, medical device manufacturers continue to experience 
undue delays during premarket review.141  Ivy Sports illustrates how burdensome 
the premarket process can be: the manufacturer underwent the premarket review 
process for over sixteen years, only to have its device reclassified by the FDA.142  
At that point in time, the manufacturer was forced to file for bankruptcy.143  
Small medical device manufacturers can be justifiably concerned that the FDA 
still has the power to force a company to face approval delays that are so long 
that those manufacturers may lack sufficient finances to stay in business. 
Similarly, the statutory history and case law regarding safety and effectiveness 
determinations suggest that the FDA has acquired a greater amount of control 
and discretion in making premarket decisions.144  A common criticism of the 
FDA premarket review process is that the requirements to satisfy the safety and 
efficacy standards are ambiguous, allowing the FDA to apply multiple 
interpretations during review process procedures.145  Additionally, the FDA’s 
                     
clearances and the recent introduction of user fees – fees paid by the companies to the agency in 
order to hire more reviewers to speed the process – may help improve this costly and slow gateway 
to the market.”). 
 141. See MAKOWER ET. AL, supra note 11, at 28 (discussing the results of a survey of over 200 
medical technology companies and comparing approval times and costs to the EU).  But see 5-24 
KATE H. MURASHIGE ET AL., TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 24.12[1] (2015) (citing a report 
by the Government Accountability Office that suggested that the FDA “ha[d] been too lax in its 
classification and oversight of approving certain Class II and III medical devices, and that it failed 
‘to subject some of the riskiest devices to a rigorous [pre-market approval] review mandated by 
Congress.’” (citing U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES: 
FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH 
THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 16 (2009), http://www.gao.gov 
/new.items/d09190.pdf). 
 142. See Ivy Sports Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, 938 F. Supp. 2d 47, 48–49 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d 
sub nom. Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 143. Id. at 54. 
 144. See Hall & Mercer, supra note 27, at 771–72 (discussing the impact of the Safe Medical 
Device Act of 1990 on the medical device industry).  Hall and Mercer note: 
[T]he purpose of Congress in enacting the SMDA is clear – the Act was to further a 
policy promoting the safety and effectiveness of medical devices by providing a more 
stringent or robust regulatory frame to effectuate that purpose.  After the SMDA, the 
FDA had substantially more robust authority to ensure the safety and effectiveness of 
medical devices in furtherance of congressional policy. 
Id. 
 145. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT ON FDA’S POLICY TO BE PROPOSED REGARDING 
PREMARKET NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR MODIFICATIONS TO LEGALLY MARKETED 
DEVICES 8–9 (2014) (stating that AdvaMed, a medical industry trade association, had provided 
2016] Litigating Premarket Classification Decisions 625 
authority has been supported and expanded by medical device reform, such as 
the Safe Medical Device Act (SMDA) of 1990.146  The continued existence of 
this problem is evident from the case law regarding safety and efficacy 
determinations, as courts continue to grant the FDA a great deal of discretion 
under both the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the APA and the Chevron 
doctrine.147  Such deference makes it difficult for manufacturers to challenge an 
FDA premarket decision in court.148  In cases such as Bowen, the courts have 
appropriately applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.149  Even 
in situations such as Ivy Sport, where the court ruled that the FDA failed to 
follow the correct reclassification procedures, the court did not indicate whether 
the reclassification decision itself was incorrect.150 
The statutory and regulatory history of medical devices and relevant case law 
illustrate how Congress and the courts have granted the FDA added discretion 
and control.151  Indeed, while the court in Ivy Sports seemed to rule in favor of 
business, it also required the FDA to undergo additional steps to reclassify the 
device at issue; an outcome that can further delay premarket review decisions.152  
In this sense, Ivy Sports is not really a win for small businesses.  Because the 
FDA must undergo additional procedural steps before reclassifying a device, 
small medical device manufacturers must wait longer in the premarket review 
process, and the manufacturer is not guaranteed clearance.153  All Ivy Sports 
                     
analysis to the FDA opinion that “existing guidance was vague, confusing, or not consistently 
implemented”). 
 146. See Hall & Mercer, supra note 27, at 747–48. 
 147. See supra Section I.C. 
 148. See supra Section I.C.  See also Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: 
Privatizing the FDA Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 651, 653–54 (1996).  Price comments: 
Assuming suit is filed and the affected company prevails, the company whose survival 
hinges on the agency’s continued good graces, likely will lose in the long run.  Moreover, 
the chances of winning are slim because, in such cases, the available checks on agency 
abuse – Congress and the courts – face a debate between the regulated entity and the 
FDA over the facts and circumstances of the alleged abuse.  Not surprisingly, neither 
Congress nor the courts are eager to second-guess an agency charged with consumer 
protection.  Most likely, they will defer to agency expertise. 
Id. 
 149. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 150. See supra Section I.C.4. 
 151. See supra Section I.A–C. 
 152. See supra Section I.C.4. 
 153. See, e.g., Walter Eisner, FDA Abused Power, ReGen Biologics Exonerated, 
ORTHOPEDICS THIS WEEK (Oct. 15, 2014), http://ryortho.com/2014/10/fda-abused-power-regen-
biologics-exonerated/ (noting that the FDA may still classify the device at issue in Ivy Sports as a 
Class III device even after spending over $30 million to obtain clearance). 
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seemed to do was highlight the FDA’s growing regulatory control over medical 
devices.154 
Critics of the premarket process also assert that patients are harmed because 
devices intended for medical treatment are withheld from the market and, by 
implication, their end users.155  Patients must wait a long time to receive medical 
care with a specific device, arguably placing the United States at a disadvantage 
compared to other countries that facilitate faster regulatory approval and market 
entry.156  While the FDA may argue that long wait times allow it to ensure that 
only safe and effective medical devices enter the market, some patients may go 
untreated or without more effective treatment because devices that could make 
a difference in their care are mired in the approval process.157 
B.  Proposed Reforms to Medical Device Premarket Regulation 
1.  Start All Over By Rewriting the Premarket Process 
Possible solutions to the problems inherent in the FDA’s current premarket 
review process have surfaced both in the medical device industry and in the law.  
Some manufacturers suggest that premarket regulations should be rewritten 
completely, especially the 510(k) process.158  This proposition is supported by 
the independent assessment of the FDA process that was conducted pursuant to 
the Medical Device User Fee Amendments159 and an assessment conducted by 
the Institute of Medicine in 2009.160  However, a complete rewrite of medical 
                     
 154. See Thomas Sullivan, Ivy Sports Medicine v. Burwell, et al.: FDA May Not “Short-
Circuit” the Process for Reclassifying Medical Devices, Rules Federal Appeals Court, POL’Y & 
MED. (Sept. 29, 2014, 5:40 AM), http://www.policymed.com/2014/09/fda-may-not-short-circuit-
the-process-for-reclassifying-medical-devices-rule-dc-circuit-court.html. 
 155. See Scott, supra note 10, at 389 (explaining that premarket regulation places a burden on 
patients “because FDA’s premarket pathways can be prohibitively expensive to navigate, 
manufacturers are discouraged from developing new devices in the first place; this limits patient 
treatment options and halts device technology progression . . . . [and also] forc[es] suffering patients 
to wait for beneficial new devices”); see also Sullivan, supra note 154 (noting that allowing the 
FDA to reclassify devices without going through the proper procedures “would be detrimental not 
only to countless companies . . . but also to patients in need of new, innovative devices”). 
 156. See Scott, supra note 10, at 389–91 (describing the “device lag” phenomenon, where the 
availability of devices in the United States lags significantly behind other countries because of long 
FDA approval times). 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Altenstetter, supra note 64, at 461. 
 159. The independent assessment identified thirty-one unique issues in the FDA’s premarket 
review process for medical devices.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MDUFA II/III EVALUATION – 
PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 136, at 31. 
 160. The Institute of Medicine’s first recommendation stated that: 
The Food and Drug Administration should obtain adequate information to inform the 
design of a new medical-device regulatory framework for Class II devices so that the 
current 510(k) process, in which the standard for clearance is substantial equivalence to 
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device regulations would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement from a 
practicality and timeliness standpoint.  Congress is unlikely to completely 
rewrite existing legislation, and existing political gridlock could further stymie 
this task. 
2.  Remove Premarket Review and Place More Emphasis on Postmarket 
Surveillance 
Premarket review could be removed altogether.161  This alternative approach 
involves the FDA completely eliminating premarket regulatory review 
processes and utilizing the postmarket evaluation system to make safety and 
efficacy decisions instead.162  Proponents of an all-postmarket method of 
medical device regulation argue that, while it may seem that such a system could 
result in a dangerous regulatory environment, a strong postmarket regulation 
system would more adequately allow medical device manufacturers to bring 
innovative products to market without getting caught up in burdensome 
premarket delays such as the 510(k) and the PMA.163  Proponents argue that the 
market, competition, and the threat of tort liability are enough to incentivize and 
motivate manufacturers to take the steps necessary to ensure that their devices 
are safe.164 
However, completely removing the premarket review process and moving it 
to postmarket surveillance places too much reliance on the market to self-
                     
previously cleared devices, can be replaced with an integrated premarket and postmarket 
regulatory framework that effectively provides a reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness throughout the device life cycle.  Once adequate information is available to 
design an appropriate medical-device regulatory framework, Congress should enact 
legislation to do so. 
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 196 (2011).  The Institute of Medicine concluded that 
the 510(k) process was outdated and should be replaced with a regulatory framework that is “more 
in line with the requirements of modern science, medicine, and technology.”  Altenstetter, supra 
note 64, at 461. 
 161. See Scott, supra note 10, at 398–99, 402–04 (outlining the advantages of eliminating 
premarket FDA review and placing safety and efficacy decisions on postmarket surveillance). 
 162. Id. at 398 (“Rather than reforming its premarket review programs, FDA should eliminate 
them, utilizing postmarket activities as the primary means of promoting device safety.”). 
 163. Id.  Scott writes: 
Under this proposed approach, very limited premarket controls would remain in place. 
FDA would keep its registration and device listing requirements, as well as its GMP and 
labeling regulations, but it would get rid of both the 510(k) and PMA programs.  It can 
be argued that this approach would result in a “loose” and unsafe regulatory environment, 
however, the protections offered by premarket programs would be preserved through the 
creation of a sharp and efficient postmarket surveillance system.  Strong postmarket 
regulation would encourage device safety while allowing device innovation to thrive. 
Id. 
 164. Id. at 398–99 (discussing the checks that would exist under a provider-centered 
postmarket surveillance system). 
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regulate device safety.  Some oversight from a common entity (in this case, the 
FDA) is prudent and justifiable to ensure that manufacturers do not introduce 
devices into the stream of commerce that could potentially harm patients.  
Additionally, removing the entire premarket review process would be contrary 
to congressional intent.  Congress enacted, and continues to enact, legislation to 
address and review the requirements for a premarket review process for medical 
devices.165  Removing the premarket review process conflicts with Congress’s 
statutory scheme focusing on a premarket regulatory system that has been 
deemed important to ensure Americans’ health and safety.166 
3.  Privatize the Premarket Review Process 
Premarket review could be privatized and conducted by third parties, rather 
than a government agency.167  Proponents of privatization argue that there would 
be benefits to both manufacturers and the FDA, as privatizing premarket review 
would allow the FDA to move its resources to other parts of the agency while 
still ensuring that medical devices placed in the market are safe and effective.168  
Additionally, if premarket decisions are offered by a third party rather than a 
government agency, the courts would not have to apply an “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard, making manufacturers more likely to succeed in a 
lawsuit.169  However, it is unlikely that Congress would allow private entities to 
control premarket review because government oversight of the medical device 
                     
 165. See supra Section I.A; see also Ivy Sports Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, 938 F. Supp. 2d 47, 62 
(D.D.C. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Ivy 
Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86–87 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 166. See supra notes Section I.A. 
 167. See generally Price, supra note 148, at 665–66 (discussing the benefits of privatizing 
premarket medical device regulations). 
 168. Id.  Price writes: 
Perhaps the most immediate and noticeable effect of privatization, under either domestic 
or foreign review, would be a liberation of FDA resources, enabling the agency to focus 
on other areas such as providing unbiased information to consumers, setting safety and 
efficacy standards, enforcing those standards, and, perhaps most important, determining 
when to exercise its veto power over third-party recommendations.  A post-privatization 
FDA thus would not be a mere administrative shell, but instead would continue to be the 
regnant protector of consumer safety.  Products would be judged by the same stringent 
safety and efficacy standards used today, ensuring the consumer that, no matter what 
entity conducts the review (public or private), the American “gold standard” of safety 
and efficacy would remain uncompromised. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 169. Id. at 666 (discussing how “potentially arbitrary or capricious action by the FDA is 
unchecked by courts reluctant to second-guess agency decisions cloaked in the mantra of safety or 
efficacy.  This lack of judicial oversight, in turn, effectively establishes an irrebuttable presumption 
of validity to FDA decisions, creating the potential to abuse its monopolistic position.”). 
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approval process promotes an efficient and structured oversight.170  If a third 
party oversaw the premarket process, the FDA would have less control, which 
could lead to different interpretations of what is required for a device to be safe 
and effective. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR REMOVING EFFICACY FROM PREMARKET MEDICAL DEVICE 
REGULATIONS 
While there are valid arguments for the three premarket reform propositions, 
one radical approach incorporates these three ideas.  This approach would have 
FDA premarket regulations be primarily concerned with product safety.  The 
premarket process would be reformed to focus on product safety during the 
premarket phase and shift product efficacy to postmarket surveillance.  
Congressional initiatives and court decisions to modify the administrative 
procedural process have not reduced the burden on small medical device 
manufacturers, as they continue to experience delays and find no relief in 
court.171  Legislative efforts to reform the medical device premarket process 
have been unsuccessful in making the process less burdensome and have 
resulted in the FDA receiving more authority and control over the process. 
Additionally, the courts have strengthened the FDA’s authority through their 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard and the Chevron doctrine.172  
The Ivy Sports decision may have required the FDA to undergo notice and 
comment procedures when it reclassifies a medical device,173 but the notice and 
comment process as written in FDA regulations appears to only require that the 
FDA take public comments into “consideration” when drafting an order.174  The 
FDA is not required to change a classification decision if the public disagrees 
with the decision, as demonstrated in the Contact Lens case where the 
                     
 170. Critics of third-party review also express concern that private reviewers will pose a bias 
based on financial incentives.  See Merrill, supra note 5, at 1859.  Merrill writes: 
Critics of third party-review have also focused on the temptation for private reviewers to 
find products safe and effective in order to attract patrons for their service.  The concept 
presents another kind of potential conflict of interest as well.  It seems likely that those 
who are best equipped to assess the reported results of clinical trials for drugs and devices 
will be individuals who already perform such tasks for manufacturers of drugs and 
devices.  Some will have had experience at FDA.  Few are likely to be free of financial 
relationships that ordinarily would render them unemployable by FDA, either as 
consultants or members of advisory committees.  If such individuals were eligible to 
serve as reviewers, safeguards against conflict of interest would be extremely 
cumbersome or they would collapse entirely. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 171. See supra Part II. 
 172. See supra Section I.B.4. 
 173. See Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86–87 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 174. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
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manufacturer disagreed with the FDA’s reclassification decision.175  As a result, 
judicial interpretations of FDA regulations, such as that in Ivy Sports,176 have 
placed an additional burden on small medical device manufacturers because the 
process now involves more steps rather than fewer.  The courts have not made 
it any easier for manufacturers to bring their innovative devices to market. 
A.  Case Law’s Tendency to Favor Product Safety Over Efficacy 
The case law interpreting premarket review reflects the importance the courts 
attach to product and patient safety.177  However, the case law has been less 
focused on the importance of efficacy, which further suggests that product safety 
is the more important component in premarket review.  For example, the Bowen 
court emphasized that “the only question under the [FDCA] is whether the 
intended use of the product is to prevent disease, not whether the product 
actually prevents disease.”178  This tends to indicate that whether a device is 
effective at treating a disease is not as important of an inquiry as whether the 
manufacturer intends to treat a disease. 
B.  The FDA’s Goal of Balancing Patient Safety with Device Innovation: 
Removing Efficacy Will Not Compromise Device Safety 
The premarket process suggests that product safety takes precedence over 
efficacy requirements.  As a consequence, higher-risk devices are considered to 
have a stronger likelihood of being dangerous179 because the FDA’s premarket 
                     
 175. See Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food & Drug Admin., 766 F.2d 592, 596–97 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 176. See Ivy Sports Med., LLC, 767 F.3d at 87–88. 
 177. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Food, & Drug Admin., 762 F. Supp. 382, 390 (D.D.C. 1991) (“[T]he 
evidence showed that a performance standard was not immediately necessary to protect the public 
health.”).  See also Cytori Therapeutics, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 715 F.3d 922, 925 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (“[T]he devices had different technological characteristics or posed different safety 
concerns.”). 
 178. United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 179. See James M. Flaherty, Jr., Defending Substantial Equivalence: An Argument for the 
Continuing Validity of the 510(k) Premarket Notification Process, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 923–
24 (2008) (discussing the relationship between regulatory burdens in the premarket process and the 
risk-based nature of the FDA’s classification system).  See also FRANK, supra note 81, at 3.  Frank 
writes: 
Due to the risky nature of some of [the] potentially harmful devices, a certain degree of 
regulation must be attained in relation to the risks inherent in each device.  Introducing 
new (advanced) medical devices to provide better health care improves medical treatment 
and overall care for patients, and, thus, innovation in the medical device field should be 
stimulated.  However, inflexible and over-strict regulatory demands may hamper medical 
innovation or drive even medical device manufacturers out of business.  Time has shown 
that unsafe medical devices have the ability to cause harm to the health of individuals. 
Id. 
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classification system is risk-based.180  The FDA classification system, notably, 
does not correlate risk and efficacy in the same manner as risk and safety.181  
Statutes such as the FDA Modernization Act were enacted to assist 
manufacturers in getting safe devices to market more quickly.182 
Additionally, the FDA’s classification system and practice of placing all 
devices into Class III by default illustrates that the system places a strong 
emphasis on safety.  Bowen highlighted that safety was a priority for the FDA, 
given that the agency placed devices into Class III “by operation of law.”183  
Removing efficacy would not affect the weight the FDA places on properly 
evaluating risk and safety.  In fact, removing efficacy would allow the FDA to 
focus on confirming a device’s safety instead of fixating on efficacy 
requirements, which can be evaluated after implementation into the marketplace.  
Premarket evaluation standards may not always reduce risk and safety, as 
medical devices may perform differently once they are on the market.184  
Therefore, postmarket surveillance is an important tool to monitor safety and 
efficacy. 
C.  A Less Stringent Premarket Review Process in the EU Indicates That 
Device Safety is Not Compromised 
A strong argument against removing efficacy from premarket regulation is 
that safety would be compromised because systems that have used a similar 
approach, such as the process used by the EU, have experienced device 
recalls.185 
                     
 180. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 373 (noting that the FDA’s “classification determination is 
based upon a generalized risk assessment of the device type”). 
 181. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. 
 183. United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 687–88 (9th Cir. 1999).  According to the Ninth 
Circuit: 
Defendant did not request reclassification before he introduced [the device] into interstate 
commerce.  Therefore, even if FDA had sufficient knowledge of [the device] to 
determine that it was “safe,” [the device] nevertheless would remain a class III device by 
operation of law. That being so, the FDA’s classification was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 184. James Williams & Jens Weber-Jahnke, Regulation of Patient Management Software, 18 
HEALTH L.J. 73, 87 (2010) (“In general, even the best manufacturing, engineering, and 
communications discipline is not sufficient to prevent every form of failure or misuse.  In particular, 
devices that perform well in the laboratory may have different characteristics when they are finally 
put to use outside of a controlled environment.”). 
 185. See generally Jean-Pierre Boutrand, EU Medical Device Regulatory Framework: 
Practical Impact of New Regulations, N. AM. SCI. ASSOCS., INC. 2–4 (2013), https://www. 
namsa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/WP-EU-Medical-Device-Regulatory-Framework.pdf 
(discussing how the EU’s medical device premarket regulations have resulted in controversies and 
recalls, along with recent initiatives to improve the process). 
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The EU’s safety and performance standards focus on the manufacturer’s 
intent, revealing that the EU’s regulations are more concerned with whether the 
device serves its intended purpose.186  In comparison, the FDA’s safety and 
effectiveness standards focus on “clinically significant results,” and the FDA’s 
performance standards are only one element that the agency considers when 
evaluating medical devices.187  One might assume, then, that the EU’s less 
stringent legal standard of safety and performance would lead to a higher number 
of unsafe devices on the market. 
However, experts suggest that medical devices are statistically safe, regardless 
of whether they are approved in the United States or the EU.188  The similar 
number of recalls indicates that unsafe devices are prevented from entering the 
market in the United States at a similar rate as in the EU because the EU imposes 
“a high level of protection of health and safety” in its premarket regulations.189  
However, using a performance standard instead of effectiveness during 
premarket review would not be a suitable alternative for the FDA.  The Ethicon 
court even acknowledged that “Congress knew that FDA could not establish 
performance standards for the universe of Class II devices, and encouraged FDA 
to use its discretion to pursue such standards in order of priority” and “that a 
performance standard was not immediately necessary to protect the public 
health.”190 
Moreover, unlike the EU, the FDA’s experience with premarket regulations 
would allow the agency to anticipate problems that may arise if it shifted efficacy 
determinations to postmarket surveillance.191  The FDA has the authority to 
reclassify medical devices that have been cleared based on postmarket clinical 
data under the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act, which is a common 
practice for 510(k) devices.192  Given that the FDA already monitors efficacy 
                     
 186. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 187. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing special controls in Class II 
devices); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(e)(1) (2016). 
 188. Altenstetter, supra note 64, at 460–61 (noting that one U.S. lawmaker remarked that 
“according to recent studies, medical devices […] are statistically as safe as FDA-cleared or 
approved devices and have comparable outcomes”).  Altenstetter also says that “[an] extensive 
review of recent literature on the FDA hardly suggests that the FDA’s record is superior to that of 
EU regulation.”  Id. 
 189. Council Directive 98/79, 1998 O.J. (L 331) 16 (EC). 
 190. Ethicon, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 762 F. Supp. 382, 390 (D.D.C. 1991). 
 191. The FDA’s premarket regulations have existed since 1976, and the EU introduced 
premarket regulation starting in the 1990s.  See John Y. Chai, Medical Device Regulation in the 
United States and the European Union: A Comparative Study, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 57, 60–61 
(2000) (comparing the FDA’s premarket regulatory system to the EU’s newer premarket regulatory 
system).  See generally FRANK, supra note 81, at 239–53 (comparing and contrasting specific 
components of the FDA’s medical device regulatory system to the EU’s medical device regulatory 
system, from both a substantive and institutional view). 
 192. See Shapiro, supra note 26, at 385–86. 
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requirements in the postmarket surveillance process, shifting premarket efficacy 
determinations to the postmarket surveillance process would not be a dramatic 
change. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Establishing a proper evaluation method to determine when medical devices 
are safe to enter the market is necessary to ensure that patients have access to 
safe medical treatment.  While Congress and the FDA have attempted to make 
it less burdensome for small manufacturers to bring innovative devices into the 
market,193 these initiatives are not enough.  Litigation surrounding FDA safety 
and efficacy determinations demonstrates that courts make favorable 
presumptions for the FDA, making it difficult for small business medical device 
manufacturers to be successful in a courtroom.194  By shifting efficacy 
determinations into the postmarket regulatory system, the FDA can maintain its 
focus on ensuring that only safe devices make it to market, while removing 























                     
 193. See supra Sections I.A–B.1. 
 194. See supra Section I.C.1–4. 
 195. See supra Part IV. 
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